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Abstract
We provide easily verifiable conditions for the well-posedness of the optimal investment
problem for a behavioral investor in an incomplete discrete-time multiperiod financial market
model, for the first time in the literature. Under suitable assumptions we also establish the
existence of optimal strategies.
Keyword : Optimisation, existence and well-posedness in behavioral finance, “S-shaped” utility
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1 Introduction
A classical optimization problem of mathematical finance is to find the investment strategy that
maximizes the expected von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of the portfolio value of some economic
agent, see e.g. Chapter 2 of Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002). In mathematical terms, Eu(X) needs to
be maximized in X where u is a concave increasing function and X runs over values of admissible
portfolios.
In the paper Kahneman and Tversky (1979), based on experimentation, the authors contest
the expected utility paradigm and propose the cumulative prospect theory. This theory asserts
that: first, agents behave differently on gains and on losses. Second, agents overweight small
probabilities and underweight large probabilities. Third, agents evaluate assets in comparison
with some benchmark rather than based on final wealth positions. This can be translated into
mathematics by the following assumptions: investors use an “S-shaped” utility function u (i.e.
u(x) = u+(x), x ≥ 0; u(x) = −u−(−x), x < 0 where u+, u− : R+ → R are concave and increasing)
and they also distort the probability measure: instead of expectations, Choquet integrals appear.
Furthermore, maximization of their objective function takes place over the random variables X−B
where B is a fixed (stochastic) reference point and X , again, runs over the values of admissible
portfolios.
That paper triggered an avalanche of subsequent investigations, especially in the economics
literature. See the references of Jin and Zhou (2008) for a sample relevant to our present dis-
cussions. Mathematical treatments rarely went beyond simple, one-step models (we only know
of Berkelaar et al. (2004), Jin and Zhou (2008) and Carlier and Dana (2011) where multiperiod
models are studied; in Berkelaar et al. (2004), however, no probability distortion is considered).
The reason for this, as pointed out in Jin and Zhou (2008), is the presence of massively difficult
obstacles: the objective function is non-concave and the probability distortions make it impossible
to use dynamic programming and the related machinery based on the Bellmann equation.
In Jin and Zhou (2008) a rather specific continuous-time market model (driven by Brownian
motion) is treated. As this model is complete (all “reasonable” random variables can be realized
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by continuous trading), the behavioral investment problem can be reduced to a (still very difficult)
static optimization over a set of random variables.
The arguments of both Jin and Zhou (2008) and Carlier and Dana (2011) heavily rely on com-
pleteness and there has not yet been any treatment of discrete-time multiperiod models in the
literature. In the present article we make a substantial step ahead by studying this problem in
a multiperiod, generically incomplete market model. We allow for a possibly stochastic reference
point B and need no concavity assumptions on u+, u−: only their behavior at infinity matters.
The issue of well-posedness is a recurrent theme in this literature (see Bernard and Ghossoub.
(2010), He and Zhou). As far as we know, our Theorem 4.3 below is the first result of its kind for
discrete-time multiperiod models.
The conditions in Jin and Zhou (2008) are not easily checked and have no obvious interpre-
tations. Here we manage to provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions which apply in the
case where u+, u− and the probability distortions are all “power-like” functions satisfying certain
parameter constraints and where appropriate moment conditions hold for the price process. We
also give examples providing parameter restrictions which are necessary for well-posedness.
Existence of optimal strategies is fairly subtle in this setting. Assuming a certain structure for
the information flow (see Assumption 5.1) we manage to establish an existence result in Theorem
5.6 below. Finally, we exhibit examples showing that our assumptions are satisfied in a reasonably
large class of models.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we introduce our models; section 3 presents
examples pertinent to the well-posedness of the problem; section 4 provides a sufficient condition
for well-posedness in a multiperiod market; section 5 proves the existence of optimizers under
appropriate conditions, section 6 gives examples while section 7 contains technical material.
2 Market model description
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)0≤t≤T , P ) be a discrete-time filtered probability space with time horizon T ∈ N.
The set of m-dimensional Ft-measurable random variables will be denoted by Ξmt .
Let {St, 0 ≤ t ≤ T } be a d-dimensional adapted process representing the (discounted) price of
d securities in the financial market in consideration. The notation ∆St := St − St−1 will often be
used. Trading strategies are given by d-dimensional processes {θt, 1 ≤ t ≤ T } which are supposed
to be predictable (i.e. θt is Ft−1-measurable). The class of all such strategies is denoted by Φ.
Trading is assumed to be self-financing, so the value process of a strategy θ ∈ Φ is
Xz,θt := z +
t∑
j=1
θj∆Sj ,
where z is the initial capital of the agent in consideration and the concatenation xy of elements
x, y ∈ Rd means that we take their scalar product.
Consider the following technical condition (R). It says, roughly speaking, that there are no
redundant assets, even conditionally, see also Remark 9.1 of Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002).
(R) The support of the (regular) conditional distribution of ∆St with respect to Ft−1 is not
contained in any proper affine subspace of Rd, almost surely, for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
The following absence of arbitrage condition is standard, it is equivalent to the existence of a
risk-neutral measure in discrete time markets with finite horizon, see e.g. Dalang et al. (1990).
(NA) If X0,θT ≥ 0 a.s. for some θ ∈ Φ then X0,θT = 0 a.s.
The next proposition is a trivial reformulation of Proposition 1.1 in Carassus and Ra´sonyi
(2007).
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Proposition 2.1. The condition (R) + (NA) is equivalent to the existence of Ft-measurable pos-
itive random variables κt, πt , 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 such that
ess. inf
ξ∈Ξdt
P (ξ∆St+1 ≤ −κt|ξ| /Ft) ≥ πt a.s.
Let W denote the set of R-valued random variables Y such that E|Y |p <∞ for all p > 0. This
family is clearly closed under addition, multiplication and taking conditional expectation. The
family of nonnegative elements in W is denoted by W+. With a slight abuse of notation, for a
d-dimensional random variable Y , we write Y ∈ W when we indeed mean |Y | ∈ W . We will also
need W+t :=W+ ∩ Ξ1t .
We now present the hypotheses on the market model that will be needed for our main results
in the sequel.
Assumption 2.2. For all t ≥ 1, ∆St ∈ W. Furthermore, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T −1, there exist κt, πt ∈ Ξ1t
satisfying 1/κt, 1/πt ∈ W+t such that
ess. inf
ξ∈Ξdt
P (ξ∆St+1 ≤ −κt|ξ|/Ft) ≥ πt a.s. (1)
The first item in the above assumption could be weakened to the existence of the Nth moment
for N large enough but this would lead to complications with no essential gain in generality, which
we prefer to avoid. In the light of Proposition 2.1, (1) is a certain strong form of no-arbitrage.
Section 6 exhibits concrete examples showing that Assumption 2.2 holds in a broad class of market
models. We note that, by Proposition 2.1, Assumption 2.2 implies both (NA) and (R) above.
Now we turn to investors’ behavior, as modeled by cumulative prospect theory, see Kahneman and Tversky
(1979); Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Agents’ attitude towards gains and losses will be expressed
by the functions u+, u−. Agents are assumed to have a (possibly stochastic) reference point B and
a distorted view of reality expressed by the probability distortion functions w+, w−.
Formally, we assume that u+, u− : R+ → R+ are nondecreasing, continuous functions with
u+(0) = u−(0) = 0. We fix B, a scalar-valued random variable. The functions w+, w− : [0, 1] →
[0, 1] are nondecreasing and continuous with w+(0) = w−(0) = 0 and w+(1) = w−(1) = 1.
Remark 2.3. Actually, the main results of the present article need less about u±, w± than stip-
ulated here, in particular, about continuity and monotonicity. But as these are fairly natural
requirements for agents’ preferences, we make these assumptions throughout the paper.
Example 2.4. A typical choice is taking
u+(x) = x
α, u−(x) = kx
β
for some k > 0 and setting
w+(t) =
tγ
(tγ + (1− t)γ)1/γ , w−(t) =
tδ
(tδ + (1 − t)δ)1/δ ,
with constants 0 < α, β, γ, δ ≤ 1. In Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the following choice was
made: α = β = 0.88, k = 2.25, γ = 0.61 and δ = 0.69.
We define, for X0 ∈ Ξ10 and θ ∈ Φ,
V +(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) :=
∫ ∞
0
w+
(
P
(
u+
([
XX0,θT − B
]
+
)
≥ y
))
dy,
and
V −(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) :=
∫ ∞
0
w−
(
P
(
u−
([
XX0,θT −B
]
−
)
≥ y
))
dy,
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and whenever V −(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) <∞ we set
V (X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) := V
+(X0; θ1, . . . , θT )− V −(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ).
We denote by A(X0) the set of strategies θ ∈ Φ such that
V −(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) <∞
and we call them admissible (with respect to X0).
Remark 2.5. If there were no probability distortions (i.e. w+(t) = w−(t) = t) then we would sim-
ply get V +(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) = Eu+
([
XX0,θT −B
]
+
)
and V −(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) = Eu−
([
XX0,θT − B
]
−
)
,
i.e. the expected “utility” of gains (resp. losses) with respect to the given reference point B.
We refer to Carassus and Pham (2009) for the explicit treatment of this problem in a continuous
time, complete case under the assumptions that u+ is concave, u− is convex and B is deterministic.
The present paper is concerned with maximizing V (X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) over θ ∈ A(X0). We seek
to find conditions ensuring well-posedness, i.e.
sup
θ∈A(X0)
V (X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) <∞,
and the existence of θ∗ ∈ A(X0) attaining this supremum.
3 A first look at well-posedness
For simplicity we assume that u+(x) = x
α and u−(x) = x
β for some 0 < α, β ≤ 1; the distortion
functions are w+(t) = t
γ , w−(t) = t
δ for some 0 < γ, δ ≤ 1. The example given below applies also
to w+, w− with a power-like behavior near 0 such as those in Example 2.4 above.
Let us consider a two-step market model with S0 = 0, ∆S1 uniform on [−1, 1], P (∆S2 = ±1) =
1/2 and ∆S2 is independent of ∆S1. This choice assures that there is absence of arbitrage. Let
F0,F1,F2 be the natural filtration of S0, S1, S2.
Let us choose initial capital X0 = 0 and reference point B = 0. We consider the strategy given
by θ1 = 0 and θ2 = g(∆S1) for some measurable g : R→ R such that the distribution function of
θ2 is
F (y) = 0, y < 1, F (y) = 1− 1
yℓ
, y ≥ 1,
where ℓ > 0 will be chosen later; such a g exists as ∆S1 has uniform law. It follows that
V +(X0; θ1, θ2) =
∫ ∞
0
P γ((θ2∆S2)
α
+ > y) =
∫ ∞
1
1
2γ
1
yℓγ/α
dy,
and
V −(X0; θ1, θ2) =
∫ ∞
0
P δ((θ2∆S2)
β
− > y) =
∫ ∞
1
1
2δ
1
yℓδ/β
dy.
If we have α/γ > β/δ then there is ℓ > 0 such that
γℓ
α
< 1 <
δℓ
β
,
which entails V −(X0; θ1, θ2) < ∞ and V +(X0; θ1, θ2) = ∞ so the optimization problem becomes
ill-posed.
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One may wonder whether this phenomenon could be ruled out by restricting the set of strategies
e.g. to bounded ones. The answer is no. Considering θ1(n) := 0, θ2(n) := min{θ2, n} for n ∈ N we
obtain that V +(X0; θ1(n), θ2(n))→∞, V −(X0; θ1(n), θ2(n))→ V −(X0; θ1, θ2) <∞ by monotone
convergence, which shows that we still have
sup
ψ
V (X0;ψ1, ψ2) =∞,
where ψ ranges over the family of bounded strategies.
This shows that the ill-posedness phenomenon is not just a pathology but comes from the fact
that one may use the information available at time 1 when choosing the investment strategy θ2.
We mention another case of ill-posedness which is present already in one-step models, as noticed
in He and Zhou and Bernard and Ghossoub. (2010). We generalize a bit the previous setting,
u+, u−,∆S1 remain unchanged but we allow general distortions, assuming only that w+(t), w−(t) >
0 for t > 0. The market is defined by S0 = 0, ∆S2 = ±1 with probabilities p, 1 − p for some
0 < p < 1 and ∆S2 is independent of ∆S1. Take θ1(n) = 0 = X0 = B and θ2(n) := n, n ∈ N, then
V +(X0; θ1(n), θ2(n)) = n
αw+(p) and V
−(X0; θ1(n), θ2(n)) = n
βw−(p). If α > β then, whatever
w+, w− are, we have V (X0; θ1(n), θ2(n)) → ∞. Hence, in order to get a well-posed problem one
needs to have α ≤ β, as already observed in Bernard and Ghossoub. (2010) and He and Zhou.
We add a comment on the case α = β (the choice of Tversky and Kahneman (1992)): whatever
w+, w− are, we may easily choose p such that the problem becomes ill-posed.
Since it would be difficult to exclude such a simple types of probability laws for ∆S2 on economic
grounds we are led to the conclusion that in order to get a mathematically meaningful optimization
problem for a reasonably wide range of price processes one needs to assume both
α < β and α/γ ≤ β/δ. (2)
In the following section we propose an easily verifiable sufficient condition for the well-posedness
of this problem in multiperiod discrete-time market models. The decisive condition we require is
α/γ < β, see (7) below. This is stronger than (2) but still reasonably general. If w−(t) = t
(i.e. δ = 1, no distortion on loss probabilities) then (7) is essentially sharp, as the present section
highlights.
4 Well-posedness in the multiperiod case
Assumptions 2.2, 4.1 and 4.2 will be in force throughout this section. We first present the
conditions we need on u±, w±. Basically, we require that u± behave in a power-like way at infinity
and w± do likewise in the neighborhood of 0. Condition (7) has already been mentioned in the
previous section. It has a rather straightforward interpretation: the investor takes losses more
seriously than gains and the distortion on gains is not too strong so that it is still outbalanced by
loss aversion (as represented by parameter β). We stress that no concavity assumption is made on
u+, u−, unlike in all related papers.
Assumption 4.1. We assume that
u+(x) ≤ k+xα + k¯+, (3)
k−x
β − k¯− ≤ u−(x), (4)
w+(x) ≤ gxγ , (5)
w−(x) ≥ fx, , (6)
with 0 < α, β, γ ≤ 1, k±, k¯±, g, f > 0 fixed constants and
α
γ
< β. (7)
This allows us to fix λ such that λγ > 1 and λα < β.
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We remark that the functions in Example 2.4 satisfy Assumption 4.1 whenever (7) holds.
The assumption below requires that the reference point B should be comparable to the market
performance in the sense that it can be sub-hedged by some portfolio strategy φ ∈ Φ.
Assumption 4.2. We fix a scalar random variable B such that, for some strategy φ ∈ Φ and for
some b ∈ R, we have
Xb,φT = b+
T∑
t=1
φt∆St ≤ B. (8)
The main result of the present section is the following.
Theorem 4.3. Under Assumptions 2.2, 4.1 and 4.2,
sup
θ∈A(X0)
V (X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) <∞,
whenever X0 ∈ Ξ10 with E|X0|β <∞.
In particular, the result applies forX0 a deterministic constant. We need to do some preparatory
work before proving Theorem 4.3.
Lemma 4.4. There exist constants k˜, ℓ, ℓ˜ > 0, such that
V +(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) ≤ k˜E
(
1 + |Xt +
T∑
n=1
(θn − φn)∆Sn|αλ
)
(9)
:= V˜ +(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ),
V −(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) ≥ ℓE
(
[X0 +
T∑
n=1
(θn − φn)∆Sn − b]β−
)
− ℓ˜ (10)
:= V˜ −(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ).
Proof. We will use the facts that for 0 < η ≤ 1 one has
|x+ y|η ≤ |x|η + |y|η (11)
for all x, y ∈ R and for 1 ≤ η we have |x+ y|η ≤ 2η−1(|x|η + |y|η).
We get, using (5) and Chebishev’s inequality:
V +(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) ≤ 1 + g
∫ ∞
1
Eγ
(
uλ+([X0 +
∑T
n=1 θn∆Sn −B]+)
)
yλγ
dy (12)
Evaluating the integral and using (3) we continue the estimation as
V +(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) ≤ 1 + g
λγ − 1E
γ
(
2λ−1kλ+[X0 +
T∑
n=1
θn∆Sn −B]αλ+ + 2λ−1k¯λ+
)
≤ 1 + g
λγ − 1
[
kλ+2
λ−1
(
E(|X0 +
T∑
n=1
(θn − φn)∆Sn|αλ) + |b|αλ
)
+k¯λ+2
λ−1 + 1
]
,
using the rough estimate xγ ≤ x + 1, x ≥ 0, Assumption 4.2 and the fact that C1 ≥ C2 implies
that (Y −C1)+ ≤ (Y −C2)+. This gives the first statement. For the second inequality note that,
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by (6) and Assumption 4.2,
V −(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) ≥ f
∫ ∞
0
P
(
u−([X0 +
T∑
n=1
(θn − φn)∆Sn − b]−) ≥ y
)
dy
= fEu−
(
[X0 +
T∑
n=1
(θn − φn)∆Sn − b]−
)
≥ fk−E
(
[X0 +
T∑
n=1
(θn − φn)∆Sn − b]β−
)
− f k¯−.
Whenever V˜ −(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) <∞, we set
V˜ (X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) := V˜
+(X0; θ1, . . . , θT )− V˜ −(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ).
For X0 ∈ Ξ10 we also introduce A˜(X0) as the set of θ ∈ Φ such that V˜ −(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) <∞.
For proving Theorem 4.3, we will make use of an auxiliary optimization problem with objective
function V˜ (X0; θ1, . . . , θT ). As no probability distortions are involved this time, we can perform
a kind of dynamic programming on this auxiliary problem. To this end we introduce, for all
t = 0, . . . , T , Xt ∈ Ξ1t and θn ∈ Ξdn−1, n ≥ t+ 1 the quantities
V˜ +t (Xt; θt+1, . . . , θT ) := k˜E
(
1 + |Xt +
T∑
n=t+1
(θn − φn)∆Sn|αλ/Ft
)
,
V˜ −t (Xt; θt+1, . . . , θT ) := ℓE
(
[Xt +
T∑
n=t+1
(θn − φn)∆Sn − b]β−/Ft
)
− ℓ˜.
Whenever V˜ −t (Xt; θt+1, . . . , θT ) <∞ a.s., we also define
V˜t(Xt; θt+1, . . . , θT ) := V˜
+
t (Xt; θt+1, . . . , θT )− V˜ −t (Xt; θt+1, . . . , θT ).
We denote by A˜t(Xt) the set of (θt+1, . . . , θT ) such that V˜ −t (Xt; θt+1, . . . , θT ) <∞ a.s.
Remark 4.5. Clearly, (θt+1, . . . , θT ) ∈ A˜t(Xt) implies (θt+m+1, . . . , θT ) ∈ A˜t+m(Xt+
∑t+m
n=t+1(θn−
φn)∆Sn), for m ≥ 0; this follows from the tower law for conditional expectations and the fact that
a bounded from below and integrable random variable is almost surely finite. For the same reason,
A˜(X0) ⊂ A˜0(X0) and, by Lemma 4.4, A(X0) ⊂ A˜(X0).
The crux of our arguments is contained in the next result.
Lemma 4.6. For each 0 ≤ t ≤ T , there exist Ctn ∈ W+n , n = t, . . . , T − 1 such that, for
(θt+1, . . . , θT ) ∈ A˜t(Xt),
V˜t(Xt; θt+1, . . . , θT ) ≤ V˜t(Xt; θ˜t+1, . . . , θ˜T ),
where (θ˜t+1, . . . , θ˜T ) ∈ A˜t(Xt) satisfies
|θ˜n − φn| ≤ Ctn−1[|Xt|+ 1], (13)
for n = t+ 1, . . . , T , whenever Xt ∈ Ξ1t .
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Proof. Notice that for t = T the statement of the Lemma is trivial as there are no strategies
involved. Let us assume that the Lemma is true for t + 1, we will deduce that it holds true for
t, too. Let Xt ∈ Ξ1t and (θt+1, . . . , θT ) ∈ A˜t(Xt). Let Xt+1 = Xt + (θt+1 − φt+1)∆St+1, then
Xt+1 ∈ Ξ1t+1 and by Remark 4.5, (θt+2, . . . , θT ) ∈ A˜t+1(Xt+1). By induction hypothesis take
(θˆt+2, . . . , θˆT ) ∈ A˜t+1(Xt+1) such that
|θˆn − φn| ≤ Ct+1n−1[|Xt + (θt+1 − φt+1)∆St+1|+ 1] (14)
and V˜t+1(Xt+1; θt+2, . . . , θT ) ≤ V˜t+1(Xt+1; θˆt+2, . . . , θˆT ). It is clear from (14) that∣∣∣∣∣
T∑
n=t+2
(θˆn − φn)∆Sn
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ H (|Xt + (θt+1 − φt+1)∆St+1|+ 1)
for H =
∑T
n=t+2 C
t+1
n−1|∆Sn| ∈ W+. We have
V˜t(Xt; θt+1, . . . , θT ) = E(V˜t+1(Xt + (θt+1 − φt+1)∆St+1; θt+2, . . . , θT )/Ft)
≤ E(V˜t+1(Xt + (θt+1 − φt+1)∆St+1; θˆt+2, . . . , θˆT )/Ft)
= V˜t(Xt; θt+1, θˆt+2, . . . , θˆT ). (15)
Fix some αλ < χ < β, we continue the estimation of V˜ +t = V˜
+
t (Xt; θt+1, θˆt+2, . . . , θˆT ) using the
(conditional) Ho¨lder inequality for q = χ/(αλ) and 1/p+ 1/q = 1.
V˜ +t ≤ k˜
[
1 + E(|Xt + (θt+1 − φt+1)∆St+1|αλ/Ft)+
E(Hαλ|Xt + (θt+1 − φt+1)∆St+1|αλ +Hαλ/Ft)
]
≤ k˜
[
1 + |Xt|αλ + |θt+1 − φt+1|αλE(|∆St+1|αλ/Ft) + E1/p(Hαλp/Ft) (
E1/q(|Xt|χ/Ft) + E1/q(|θt+1 − φt+1|χ|∆St+1|χ/Ft)
)
+ E(Hαλ/Ft)
]
≤ k˜
[
1 + |Xt|αλ + |θt+1 − φt+1|αλE(|∆St+1|αλ/Ft) + E1/p(Hαλp/Ft)
(|Xt|αλ
+|θt+1 − φt+1|αλE1/q(|∆St+1|χ/Ft)
)
+ E(Hαλ/Ft)
]
.
It follows that, for an appropriate Ht in W+t ,
V˜t(Xt; θt+1, . . . , θT ) ≤ ℓ˜+Ht
(
1 + |Xt|αλ + |θt+1 − φt+1|αλ
)−
ℓE
(
[Xt + (θt+1 − φt+1)∆St+1 +
T∑
n=t+2
(θˆn − φn)∆Sn − b]β−/Ft
)
.(16)
By Lemma 4.7, the event
A := {(θˆn − φn)∆Sn ≤ 0, n ≥ t+ 2; (θt+1 − φt+1)∆St+1 ≤ −κt|θt+1 − φt+1|}
satisfies P (A|Ft) ≥ π˜t with 1/π˜t ∈ W+t , hence considering
F :=
{ |θt+1 − φt+1|κt
2
≥ |Xt|+ |b|
}
(17)
we have (recall that Xt+1 = Xt + (θt+1 − φt+1)∆St+1),
1FE
(
[Xt+1 +
T∑
n=t+2
(θˆn − φn)∆Sn − b]β−/Ft
)
≥ 1FE
(
1A
( |θt+1 − φt+1|κt
2
)β
/Ft
)
≥
( |θt+1 − φt+1|κt
2
)β
π˜t1F . (18)
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As a little digression we estimate
V˜t(Xt;φt+1, . . . , φT ) = E
(
k˜(1 + |Xt|αλ)− ℓ[Xt − b]β−/Ft
)
+ ℓ˜
≥ −ℓ|Xt|β − ℓ|b|β. (19)
Let us now choose the Ft-measurable random variable Ctt so large that on the event
F˜ := {|θt+1 − φt+1| > Ctt [|Xt|+ 1]}
we have
|θt+1 − φt+1|κt
2
≥ |Xt|+ |b| (that is, F˜ ⊂ F holds)
ℓ
3
( |θt+1 − φt+1|κt
2
)β
π˜t ≥ (ℓ +Ht)|Xt|β ,
ℓ
3
( |θt+1 − φt+1|κt
2
)β
π˜t ≥ 2Ht + ℓ|b|β + ℓ˜,
ℓ
3
( |θt+1 − φt+1|κt
2
)β
π˜t ≥ Ht|θt+1 − φt+1|αλ.
One can easily check that such a Ctt exists and is in W+t . On F˜ we have, using |Xt|αλ ≤ |Xt|β +1
and thanks to (16), (18) and (19):
V˜t(Xt; θt+1, . . . , θT )− V˜t(Xt;φt+1, . . . , φT ) ≤ ℓ˜+Ht
(
2 + |Xt|β + |θt+1 − φt+1|αλ
)−
ℓ
( |θt+1 − φt+1|κt
2
)β
π˜t + ℓ|Xt|β + ℓ|b|β
≤ (ℓ+Ht)|Xt|β +Ht|θt+1 − φt+1|αλ + 2Ht
+ℓ|b|β − ℓ
( |θt+1 − φt+1|κt
2
)β
π˜t + ℓ˜
≤ 0. (20)
Consequently, defining
θ˜t+1 := φt+11F˜ + θt+11F˜ c ,
θ˜n := φn1F˜ + θˆn1F˜ c , n = t+ 2, . . . , T,
we have, using (15) and (20),
V˜t(Xt; θt+1, . . . , θT ) ≤ V˜t(Xt; θ˜t+1, . . . , θ˜T ) a.s..
By construction,
|θ˜t+1 − φt+1| ≤ Ctt [|Xt|+ 1],
and, for n ≥ t+ 2,
|θ˜n − φn| ≤ Ct+1n−1[|Xt + (θ˜t+1 − φt+1)∆St+1|+ 1] ≤ Ct+1n−1[|Xt|+ Ctt (|Xt|+ 1)|∆St+1|+ 1],
hence we may set
Ctn−1 := C
t+1
n−1(C
t
t |∆St+1|+ 1)
for n ≥ t+2. Clearly, Ctn−1 ∈ W+n−1. To conclude the proof it remains to check that (θ˜t+1, . . . , θ˜T ) ∈
A˜t(Xt). As by hypothesis (θt+1, . . . , θT ) ∈ A˜t(Xt), we get from (15) that V˜ −t (Xt; θt, θˆt+2, . . . , θˆT ) <
∞. Finally,
V˜ −t (Xt; θ˜t+1, . . . , θ˜T ) = 1F˜ ℓ
(
(Xt − b)β− − ℓ˜
)
+ 1F˜ c V˜
−
t (Xt; θt+1, θˆt+2, . . . , θˆT ) <∞ a.s.
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Lemma 4.7. There exists π˜t with 1/π˜t ∈ W+t such that
P ((θt+1 − φt+1)∆St+1 ≤ −κt|θt+1 − φt+1|, (θˆn − φn)∆Sn ≤ 0, n = t+ 2, . . . , T/Ft) ≥ π˜t.
Proof. Define the events
At+1 := {(θt+1 − φt+1)∆St+1 ≤ −κt|θt+1 − φt+1|},
An := {(θˆn − φn)∆Sn ≤ 0}, t+ 2 ≤ n ≤ T.
We prove, by induction, that for m ≥ t+ 1,
E(1At+1 . . . 1Am/Ft) ≥ π˜t(m) (21)
for some π˜t(m) with 1/π˜t(m) ∈ W+t . For m = t + 1 this is just (1). Let us assume that (21) has
been shown for m− 1, we will establish it for m.
E(1Am . . . 1At+1/Ft) = E(E(1Am/Fm−1)1Am−1 . . . 1At+1/Ft)
≥ E(πm−11Am−1 . . . 1At+1/Ft)
≥ E
2(1Am−1 . . . 1At+1/Ft)
E(1/πm−1/Ft) ≥
π˜2t (m− 1)
E(1/πm−1/Ft)
by the (conditional) Cauchy inequality. Here 1/π˜t(m − 1) ∈ W+t by the induction hypothesis,
E(1/πm−1|Ft) ∈ W+t (since 1/πm−1 ∈ W+) and the statement follows.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. If A(X0) is empty, there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, by Remark 4.5
and Lemma 4.6, for all n ∈ {1, . . . , T }, there is C0n ∈ W+n such that for all θ ∈ A(X0) there exists
θ˜ ∈ A˜0(X0) satisfying |θ˜n − φn| ≤ C0n−1[|X0|+ 1], 1 ≤ n ≤ T and
V˜0(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) ≤ V˜0(X0; θ˜1, . . . , θ˜T ).
As θ ∈ A(X0), by Lemma 4.4
V (X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) ≤ V˜ (X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) = EV˜0(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) ≤ EV˜0(X0; θ˜1, . . . , θ˜T )
≤ EV˜ +0 (X0; θ˜1, . . . , θ˜T )
≤ k˜E
(
1 + |X0|αλ +
T∑
n=1
|θ˜n − φn|αλE(|∆Sn|αλ/Fn−1)
)
≤ k˜E
((
1 + |X0|αλ
)(
1 +
T∑
n=1
(C0n−1)
αλE(|∆Sn|αλ/Fn−1)
))
≤ k˜2 p−1p E1/p(1 + |X0|β)E1/q
(
1 +
T∑
n=1
(C0n−1)
αλE(|∆Sn|αλ/Fn−1)
)q
,(22)
using Ho¨lder’s inequality with p = β/(αλ) and its conjugate number q. As E|X0|β < ∞, we get
that this expression is finite, showing the Theorem.
Remark 4.8. It is worth contrasting Theorem 4.3 with Theorem 3.2 of Jin and Zhou (2008). The
latter states, in a continuous-time context, that in a typical (complete) Brownian market model
our optimization problem is ill-posed whenever u+ is unbounded and w−(t) = t (i.e. no distortion
on losses).
This phenomenon stems from the particularity of continuous-time models where the richness
of attainable payoffs leads to ill-posedness. However, in our discrete-time models the family of
replicable claims is relatively small hence ill-posedness does not occur even if w− is the identity
(as long as the other assumptions of Theorem 4.3 hold).
10
5 Existence of optimal strategies
Throughout this section, Assumptions 2.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1 and 5.3 will be in force.
Assumption 5.1. Let G0 = {∅,Ω}, Gt = σ(Z1, . . . , Zt) for 1 ≤ t ≤ T , where the Zi, i = 1, . . . , T
are RN -valued independent random variables. S0 is constant and ∆St is a continuous function of
(Z1, . . . , Zt), for all t ≥ 1 (hence St is Gt-adapted).
Furthermore, Ft = Gt ∨ F0, t ≥ 0, where F0 = σ(ε˜) with ε˜ uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and
independent of (Z1, . . . , ZT ).
We may think that Gt contains the information available at time t (given by the observable
stochastic factors Zi, i = 1, . . . , t) and F0 provides some independent random source that we use to
randomize our trading strategies (in practice, one may always generate ε˜ e.g. using a computer).
The random variables Zi represent the “innovation”: the information surplus of Fi with respect
to Fi−1, in an independent way. For the construction of the optimal strategies we use weak
convergence techniques which necessitate the additional randomness provided by ε˜ (the situation
is somewhat analogous to the construction of a weak solution for a stochastic differential equation).
Assumption 5.1 holds in many cases, see section 6 and Remark 7.8 below.
Remark 5.2. Let us take S0 = 0, P (∆S1 = 2) = 3/4, P (∆S1 = −1) = 1/4 and Gi, i = 0, 1 the
natural filtration of S. Assume, moreover, that F0 = σ(ε) where P (ε = 1) = 2/3, P (ε = −1) = 1/3
and F1 = G1 ∨ F0. Let A(0) (resp. A′(0)) denote the family of admissible strategies from 0 initial
capital which are Gt (resp. Ft) predictable. Consider u+(x) = x1/4, u−(x) = x, w+(p) = p1/2,
w−(p) = p.
We thank Andrea Meireles for numerically checking that, somewhat surprisingly,
sup
θ∈A(0)
V (0; θ1) < sup
θ∈A′(0)
V (0; θ1).
This simple example shows that additional randomness may increase the satisfaction of the agent,
hence using the randomization ε˜ appearing in Assumption 5.1 is, at least, reasonable.
This is in stark contrast with the case where there is no distortion present. The tower law
for conditional expectations shows that in this case adding an independent random variable to G0
cannot increase the agent’s attainable level of satisfaction.
Assumption 5.3. The random variable B is a continuous function of (Z1, . . . , ZT ), X0 is deter-
ministic and A(X0) is not empty.
Remark 5.4. If B is a continuous function of (S0, . . . , ST ) then Assumption 5.1 clearly implies
the first part of Assumption 5.3. If u−(x) ≤ c(1 + xη) for some c ≥ k− and η ≥ β, X0, B ∈ W
and w−(t) ≤ Ctδ for some δ ≤ 1 and C ≥ 1 then Lemma 7.1 implies that the strategy θt = 0,
t = 1, . . . , T is in A(X0), in particular, the latter set is non-empty. Actually, θ ∈ A(X0) whenever
θt ∈ W , t = 1, . . . , T . This applies, in particular, to Example 2.4.
Remark 5.5. We may and will suppose that Zi are bounded. This can always be achieved by
replacing each coordinate Zji of Zi with arctanZ
j
i for j = 1, . . . , N , i = 1, . . . , T .
We now present our main result on the existence of an optimal strategy.
Theorem 5.6. Let Assumptions 2.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1 and 5.3 hold. Then there is θ∗ ∈ A(X0) such
that
V (X0; θ
∗
1 , . . . , θ
∗
T ) = sup
θ∈A(X0)
V (X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) <∞.
Before proving Theorem 5.6, we need to extend certain arguments of Lemma 4.6 above. We fix
some αλ < χ < β for what follows.
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Lemma 5.7. Fix c ∈ R and β′′, β′ satisfying χ < β′′ < β′ < β. Assume that
EV˜t(Xt; θt+1, . . . , θT ) ≥ c
for some Ft-measurable Xt with E|Xt|β′ < ∞ and for some (θt+1, . . . , θT ) ∈ A˜t(Xt). Then there
exists Kt such that
E|θt+1 − φt+1|β
′′ ≤ Kt[E|Xt|β
′
+ 1],
where Kt does not depend on either Xt or θ.
Proof. Let Xt+1 := Xt + (θt+1 − φt+1)∆St+1 and (θˆt+2, . . . , θˆT ) ∈ A˜t+1(Xt+1) such that
|θˆn − φn| ≤ Ct+1n−1[|Xt+1|+ 1],
for n = t+ 2, . . . , T and
V˜t+1(Xt+1; θt+2, . . . , θT ) ≤ V˜t+1(Xt+1; θˆt+2, . . . , θˆT ),
see Lemma 4.6. We can obtain equations (15) and (16) just like in the proof of Lemma 4.6.
Furthermore, using (18), we get (recall (17) for the definition of F ) :
EV˜t(Xt; θt+1, . . . , θT ) ≤ E(Ht(1 + |Xt|αλ + |θt+1 − φt+1|αλ))
−ℓE
(
1F
( |θt+1 − φt+1|κt
2
)β
π˜t
)
+ ℓ˜. (23)
We now push further estimations in this last equation.
We may estimate, using the Ho¨lder inequality for p = β/β′ and its conjugate q,
E
(
1F
( |θt+1 − φt+1|κt
2
)β
π˜t
)
≥
Ep
(
1F
(
|θt+1−φt+1|κt
2
)β′
π˜
1/p
t
1
π˜
1/p
t
)
Ep/q
(
1
π˜
q/p
t
) .
The denominator here will be denoted C in the sequel. By Lemma 4.7, C <∞.
Now let us note the trivial fact that for random variables X,Y ≥ 0 such that EY β′ ≥ 2EXβ′
one has E[1{Y≥X}Y
β′ ] ≥ 12EY β
′
.
It follows that if
E
( |θt+1 − φt+1|κt
2
)β′
≥ 2E(|Xt|+ |b|)β′ (24)
holds true then, applying the trivial x ≤ xp + 1, x ≥ 0,
Ep
(
1F
(
|θt+1−φt+1|κt
2
)β′)
C
≥
Ep
((
|θt+1−φt+1|κt
2
)β′)
2pC
≥
E
(
|θt+1−φt+1|κt
2
)β′
− 1
2pC
= c1E(|θt+1 − φt+1|κt)β′ − c2
with suitable c1, c2 > 0. Using again Ho¨lder’s inequality with p = β
′/β′′ and its conjugate q,
E(|θt+1 − φt+1|κt)β′ ≥ E
p|θt+1 − φt+1|β
′′
Ep/q
(
1
κβ
′′q
t
) ≥ E|θt+1 − φt+1|β′′ − 1
Ep/q
(
1
κβ
′′q
t
) . (25)
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With suitable c′1, c
′
2 > 0, we get, whenever (24) holds, that
E
(
1F
( |θt+1 − φt+1|κt
2
)β
π˜t
)
≥ c′1E|θt+1 − φt+1|β
′′ − c′2. (26)
Estimate also, with p := χ/(αλ),
E
(
Ht(1 + |Xt|λα + |θt+1 − φt+1|λα)
) ≤ E1/q[Hqt ][1 + E1/p|Xt|χ + E1/p|θt+1 − φt+1|χ]
≤ E1/q[Hqt ][3 + E|Xt|χ + E|θt+1 − φt+1|χ]
≤ c˜[1 + E|Xt|β′ + E|θt+1 − φt+1|χ], (27)
with some c˜ > 0, using that xχ ≤ xβ′+1, x1/p ≤ x+1, for x ≥ 0. Furthermore, Ho¨lder’s inequality
with p = β′′/χ gives
E|θt+1 − φt+1|χ ≤ Eχ/β′′ |θt+1 − φt+1|β′′ .
It follows that whenever (
E|θt+1 − φt+1|β
′′
)1−χ/β′′
≥ 2c˜
c′1ℓ
, (28)
one also has
c˜E|θt+1 − φt+1|χ ≤ c
′
1ℓ
2
E|θt+1 − φt+1|β
′′
. (29)
Finally consider the condition
c′1ℓ
2
E|θt+1 − φt+1|β
′′ ≥ c˜[1 + E|Xt|β′ ] + (c′2ℓ− c+ 1) + ℓ˜. (30)
It is easy to see that we can find someKt, large enough, such that E|θt+1−φt+1|β′′ ≥ Kt[E|Xt|β′+1]
implies that (24) (recall (25)), (28), (30) all hold true. So in this case we have, from (23), (27),
(29), (26) and (30),
EV˜t(Xt; θt+1, . . . , θT ) ≤ c˜[1 + E|Xt|β′ ] + c
′
1ℓ
2
E|θt+1 − φt+1|β
′′
−c′1ℓE|θt+1 − φt+1|β
′′
+ c′2ℓ+ ℓ˜
≤ −(c′2ℓ− c+ 1) + c′2ℓ < c.
From this the statement of the lemma follows.
Corollary 5.8. Fix c ∈ R and assume that
V˜ (X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) = EV˜0(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) ≥ c
for some X0 ∈ Ξ10 with E|X0|β <∞ and some θ ∈ A˜(X0). Fix βT with χ < βT < β. There exist
constants Gt, t = 0, . . . , T − 1 such that E|θt+1 − φt+1|βT ≤ Gt[E|X0|β + 1] for t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
and Gt do not depend on X0 or on θ.
Proof. Take βT < βT−1 < . . . < β1 < β0 := β. We first prove, by induction on t, that Xt :=
X0 +
∑t
j=1(θj − φj)∆Sj , t ≥ 0 satisfy
E|Xt|βt ≤ Ct[E|X0|β + 1],
for suitable Ct > 0. For t = 0 this is trivial. Assuming it for t we will show it for t+ 1. We first
remark that
EV˜t(Xt; θt+1, . . . , θT ) = EV˜0(X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) ≥ c
13
and that by the induction hypothesisE|Xt|βt <∞ holds. As θ ∈ A˜(X0) ⊂ A˜0(X0), (θt+1, . . . , θT ) ∈
A˜t(Xt) (see Remark 4.5). Thus Lemma 5.7 applies with the choice β′′ := (βt+1+βt)/2 and β′ := βt,
and we can estimate, using Ho¨lder’s inequality with p := β′′/βt+1 (and its conjugate number q),
plugging in the induction hypothesis:
E|Xt+1|βt+1 = E|Xt + (θt+1 − φt+1)∆St+1|βt+1
≤ E|Xt|βt+1 + E|(θt+1 − φt+1)∆St+1|βt+1
≤ E|Xt|βt + 1 + E1/p|(θt+1 − φt+1)|β
′′
E1/q|∆St+1|βt+1q
≤ E|Xt|βt + 1 + C
(
E|(θt+1 − φt+1)|β′′ + 1
)
≤ E|Xt|βt + 1 + C
(
Kt(E|Xt|β′ + 1) + 1
)
= E|Xt|βt + 1 + C
(
Kt(E|Xt|βt + 1) + 1
)
≤ (1 + CKt)Ct
(
E|X0|β + 1
)
+ 1 + C + CKt
with C := E1/q|∆St+1|qβt+1 , this proves the induction hypothesis for t+ 1.
Now let us observe that, by Lemma 5.7 (with β′′ = βt+1, β
′ = βt),
E|θt+1 − φt+1|βT ≤ E|θt+1 − φt+1|βt+1 + 1
≤ Kt[E|Xt|βt + 1] + 1 ≤ Kt[Ct(E|X0|β + 1) + 1] + 1,
concluding the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5.6. Lemma 7.2 with the choice E := ε˜, l = 2 gives us ε, ε′ independent, uni-
formly distributed on [0, 1] and F0-measurable. Introduce
A′(X0) := {θ ∈ A(X0) : θt is F ′t−1-measurable for all t = 1, . . . , T },
where F ′t := Gt ∨ σ(ε′). Note that if θ ∈ A(X0) then there exists θ′ ∈ A′(X0) such that the law
of (θ,∆S) equals that of (θ′,∆S) (since the law of ε˜ equals that of ε′ and both are independent of
∆S). It follows that for all θ ∈ A(X0) there is θ′ ∈ A(X0) with
V (X0; θ1, . . . , θT ) = V (X0; θ
′
1, . . . , θ
′
T ).
Take θ(j) ∈ A(X0), j ∈ N such that
V (X0; θ1(j), . . . , θT (j))→ sup
θ∈A(X0)
V (X0; θ1, . . . , θT ), j →∞.
By Assumption 5.3 and Theorem 4.3, the supremum is finite and we can fix c such that −∞ <
c < infj V (X0; θ1(j), . . . , θT (j)). By Lemma 4.4 it implies that for all j,
V˜ (X0; θ1(j), . . . , θT (j)) > c.
By the discussions above we may and will assume θ(j) ∈ A′(X0), j ∈ N. Apply Corollary 5.8 for
some βT such that χ < βT < β to get
sup
j,t
E|θt(j)− φt|βT <∞.
It follows that the sequence of T (d+N) + 1-dimensional random variables
Y˜j := (ε
′, θ1(j)− φ1, . . . , θT (j)− φT , Z1, . . . , ZT )
are bounded in LβT (recall Remark 5.5) and hence
P (|Y˜j | > N) ≤ E|Y˜j |
βT
NβT
≤ C
NβT
,
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for some fixed C > 0, showing that the sequence of the laws of Y˜j is tight. Then, clearly, the
sequence of laws of
Yj := (ε
′, θ1(j), . . . , θT (j), Z1, . . . , ZT ),
is also tight and hence admits a subsequence (which we continue to denote by j) weakly convergent
to some probability law µ on B(RT (d+N)+1).
We will construct, inductively, θ∗t , t = 1, . . . , T such that (ε
′, θ∗1 , . . . , θ
∗
T , Z1, . . . , ZT ) has law µ
and θ∗ is F -predictable. Let M be a T (d+N) + 1-dimensional random variable with law µ.
First note that (M1+Td+1, . . . ,M1+Td+N) has the same law as Z1,
. . . , (M1+Td+(T−1)N+1, . . . ,M1+Td+TN ) has the same law as ZT .
Now let µk be the law of (M
1, . . . ,M1+kd,M1+dT+1, . . . ,M1+dT+NT ) on Rkd+NT+1 (which
represents the marginal of µ with respect to its first 1 + kd and last NT coordinates), k ≥ 0.
As a first step, we apply Lemma 7.2 with E := ε, l := T to get σ(ε)-measurable random
variables ε1, . . . , εT that are independent with uniform law on [0, 1].
Applying Lemma 7.3 with the choice N1 = d, N2 = 1, Y = ε
′ and E = ε1 we get a function
G such that (ε′, G(ε′, ε1)) has the same law as the marginal of µ1 with respect to its first 1 + d
coordinates. Let Q, Q′, U , U ′ random variables such that Q and Q′ have same law and U and U ′
have same law. If Q is independent of U and Q′ is independent of U ′, then (Q,U) and (Q′, U ′)
have same law.
Let Q = (M1, . . . ,Md+1), Q′ = (ε′, G(ε′, ε1)), U = (M
1+dT+1, . . . ,M1+dT+dN) and U ′ =
(Z1, . . . , ZT ). As (ε1, ε
′, Z1, . . . , ZT ) are independent, we get that Q
′ is independent of U ′. Now
remark that weak convergence preserves independence, so as (ε′, θ1(j)) and U
′ are independent for
all j, we get that Q is independent of U . So we conclude that (ε′, G(ε′, ε1), Z1, . . . , ZT ) has law
µ1. Define θ
∗
1 := G(ε
′, ε1), this is clearly F0-measurable.
Carrying on, let us assume that we have found θ∗j , j = 1, . . . , k such that (ε
′, θ∗1 , . . . , θ
∗
k, Z1, . . . ZT )
has law µk and θ
∗
j is a function of ε
′, Z1, . . . , Zj−1, ε1, . . . , εj only (and is thus Fj−1-measurable).
We apply Lemma 7.3 with N1 = d, N2 = kd+ kN + 1, E = εk+1 and
Y = (ε′, θ∗1 , . . . , θ
∗
k, Z1, . . . , Zk)
to get G such that (Y,G(Y, εk+1)) has the same law as (M
1, . . . ,M1+kd,M1+Td+1, . . . ,M1+Td+kN ,
M1+kd+1, . . . ,M1+(k+1)d). Thus
Q′ = (ε′, θ∗1 , . . . , θ
∗
k, G(Y, εk+1), Z1, . . . , Zk)
has the same law as Q = (M1, . . . ,M1+(k+1)d,M1+Td+1, . . . ,M1+Td+kN ). Now choose U =
(M1+dT+kN+1, . . . ,M1+dT+dN) and U ′ = (Zk+1, . . . , ZT ). As Q
′ depends only on (ε1, . . . , εk+1, ε
′,
Z1, . . . , Zk), which is independent from (Zk+1, . . . , ZT ), Q
′ is independent of U ′. Moreover,
(ε′, θ1(j), . . . , θk+1(j), Z1, . . . , Zk) and (Zk+1, . . . , ZT ) are independent for all j and weak con-
vergence preserves independence, so Q is independent of U . This entails that
(ε′, θ∗1 , . . . , θ
∗
k, G(Y, εk+1), Z1, . . . , ZT )
has law µk+1 and setting θ
∗
k+1 := G(Y, εk+1) we make sure that θ
∗
k+1 is a function of ε
′, Z1, . . . , Zk,
ε1, . . . , εk+1 only, a fortiori, it is Fk-measurable. We finally get all the θ∗j , j = 1, . . . , T such that
the law of
(ε′, θ∗1 , . . . , θ
∗
T , Z1, . . . , ZT )
equals µ = µT . We will now show that
V (X0; θ
∗
1 , . . . , θ
∗
T ) ≥ lim sup
j→∞
V (X0; θ1(j), . . . , θT (j)), (31)
which will conclude the proof.
Indeed, Hj := X0+
∑T
t=1 θt(j)∆St−B clearly converges in law to H := X0+
∑T
t=1 θ
∗
t∆St−B,
j → ∞ (note that ∆St and B are continuous functions of the Zt and X0 is deterministic). By
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continuity of u+, u− also u±([Hj ]±) tends to u±([H ]±) in law which entails that P (u±([Hj ]±) ≥
y) → P (u±([H ]±) ≥ y) for all y outside a countable set (the points of discontinuities of the
cumulative distribution functions of u±([H ]±)).
It suffices thus to find a measurable function h(y) with w+(P (u+[Hj ]+ ≥ y)) ≤ h(y), j ≥ 1 and∫∞
0
h(y)dy < ∞ and then Fatou’s lemma will imply (31). We get, just like in Lemma 4.4, using
Chebishev’s inequality, (3) and (5), for y ≥ 1:
w+(P (u+[Hj ]+ ≥ y)) ≤ C
1 + |X0|αλ +
∑T
t=1E
(|θt(j)− φt|αλ|∆St|αλ)
yλγ
≤ C
yλγ
(
1 + |X0|αλ +
T∑
t=1
E1/p|θt(j)− φt|βTE1/qW qt
)
,
for some constant C > 0 and Wt ∈ W+, t = 1, . . . , T , using Ho¨lder’s inequality with p := βT /(αλ)
and its conjugate q (recall that ∆St ∈ W). We know from the construction that supj,tE|θt(j) −
φt|βT < ∞. Thus we can find some constant C′ > 0 such that w+(P (u+[Hj ]+ ≥ y)) ≤ C′/yλγ ,
for all j. Now trivially w+(P (u+[Hj ]+ ≥ y)) ≤ w+(1) = 1 for 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. Setting h(y) := 1 for
0 ≤ y ≤ 1 and h(y) := C′/yλγ for y > 1, we conclude since λγ > 1 and thus 1/yλγ is integrable on
[1,∞).
6 Examples
Example 6.1. Let S0 be constant and ∆St ∈ W independent t = 1, . . . , T . Take Zi := ∆Si,
define G0 := {∅,Ω} and Gt := σ(Z1, . . . , Zt), T ≥ 1. Assume that St satisfies (NA) + (R) w.r.t. Gt.
Then this continues to hold for the enlargement Ft defined in Assumption 5.1. So Assumptions
2.2 and 5.1 hold with κt, πt almost surely constants since the conditional law of ∆St w.r.t. Ft−1
is a.s. equal to its actual law.
Example 6.2. Fix d ≤ N . Take Y0 ∈ RN constant and define Yt by the difference equation
Yt+1 − Yt = µ(Yt) + σ(Yt)ǫt+1,
where µ : RN → RN is bounded and continuous, σ : RN → RN×N is bounded and continuous. We
assume that there is h > 0 such that
inf
|v|=1
vTσ(x)σT (x)v ≥ h
for all x ∈ RN ; ǫt ∈ W , t = 1, . . . , T are independent with suppLaw ǫt = RN .
Thus Yt follows a discretized dynamics of a non-degenerate diffusion process. We may think
that Yt represent the evolution of N economic factors. Take G0 trivial and Gt := σ(ǫj , j ≤ t), t ≥ 1.
We claim that Yt satisfies Assumption 2.2 with respect to Gt. Indeed, Yt ∈ W is trivial and we
will show that (1) holds with κt, πt constants.
Take v ∈ RN . Obviously,
P (v(Yt+1 − Yt) ≤ −|v|/Gt) = P (v(Yt+1 − Yt) ≤ −|v|/Yt).
It is thus enough to show that there is c > 0 such that for each unit vector v and each x ∈ RN
P (v(µ(x) + σ(x)ǫt) ≤ −1) ≥ c.
Denoting by m an upper bound for |µ(x)|, x ∈ RN , we may write
P (v(µ(x) + σ(x)ǫt) ≤ −1) ≥ P (vσ(x)ǫt ≤ −(m+ 1)).
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Here y = vTσ(x) is a vector of length at least
√
h, hence the absolute value of one of its components
is at least
√
h/N . Thus we have
P (vTσ(x)ǫt ≤ −(m+ 1)) ≥ min
(
min
i,ki
P (
√
h/Nǫit ≤ −(m+ 1), ki(j)ǫjt ≤ 0, j 6= i);
min
i
P (
√
h/Nǫit ≥ (m+ 1), ki(j)ǫjt ≤ 0, j 6= i)
)
where i ranges over 1, . . . , N and ki ranges over the (finite) set of all functions from {1, 2, . . . , i−
1, i+ 1, . . . , N} to {1,−1} (representing all the possible configurations for the signs of yj, j 6= i).
This minimum is positive by our assumption on the support of ǫt.
Now we can take Sit := Y
i
t , i = 1, . . . , d for some d ≤ N . When N > d, we may think that
the Yj , d < j ≤ N are not prices of some traded assets but other relevant economic variables that
influence the market. It is easy to check that Assumption 2.2 holds for St, too, with respect to Gt.
Enlarging each Gt by ε˜, independent of ǫ1, . . . , ǫT we get Ft as in Assumption 5.1. Clearly,
Assumption 2.2 continues to hold for St with respect to Ft and Assumption 5.1 is then also true
as St is a continuous function of ǫ1, . . . , ǫt.
Example 6.3. Take Yt as in the above example. For simplicity, we assume d = N = 1. Further-
more, let ǫt, t = 1, . . . , T be such that for all ζ > 0,
Eeζ|ǫt| <∞.
Set St := exp(Yt) this time. We claim that Assumption 2.2 holds true for St with respect to the
filtration Gt. Obviously, ∆St ∈ W , t ≥ 1.
We choose κt := St/2. Clearly, 1/κt ∈ W . It suffices to prove that 1/P (St+1−St ≤ −St/2/Gt)
and 1/P (St+1 − St ≥ St/2/Gt) belong to W . We will show only the second containment, the first
one being similar. This amounts to checking
1/P (exp{Yt+1 − Yt} ≥ 3/2/Yt) ∈ W .
Let us notice that
P (exp{Yt+1 − Yt} ≥ 3/2/Yt) = P (µ(Yt) + σ(Yt)ǫt+1 ≥ ln(3/2)/Yt)
= P (ǫt+1 ≥ ln(3/2)− µ(Yt)
σ(Yt)
/Yt)
≥ P (ǫt+1 ≥ ln(3/2)−m√
h
),
which is a deterministic positive constant, by the assumption on the support of ǫt+1. Defining
the enlarged Ft, Assumptions 2.2 and 5.1 hold for St. Examples 6.2 and 6.3 are pertinent, in
particular, when the ǫt are Gaussian.
7 Auxiliary results
We start with a simple observation.
Lemma 7.1. If Y ∈ W+ then ∫ ∞
0
P δ(Y ≥ y)dy <∞,
for all δ > 0.
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Proof. As by Chebishev’s inequality and Y ∈ W+,
P (Y ≥ y) ≤M(N)y−N , y > 0,
for all N > 0, for a constant M(N) := EY N , we can choose N so large to have Nδ > 1, showing
that the integral in question is finite.
The following Lemmata are fairly standard but we include their proofs in want of an appropriate,
precise reference.
Lemma 7.2. Let E be uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Then for each l ≥ 1 there are measurable
f1, . . . , fl : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that f1(E), . . . , fl(E) are independent and uniform on [0, 1].
Proof. We first recall that if Y1,Y2 are uncountable Polish spaces then they are Borel isomorphic,
i.e. there is a bijection ψ : Y1 → Y2 such that ψ, ψ−1 are measurable (with respect to the respective
Borel fields); see e.g. page 159 of Dellacherie and Meyer (1979).
Fix a Borel-isomorphism ψ : R→ [0, 1]l and define the probability κ(A) := λl(ψ(A)), A ∈ B(R),
where λl is the l-dimensional Lebesgue-measure restricted to [0, 1]
l. Denote by F (x) := κ((−∞, x]),
x ∈ R the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) corresponding to κ and set
F−(u) := inf{q ∈ Q : F (q) ≥ u}, u ∈ (0, 1).
This function is measurable and it is well-known that F−(E) has law κ. Now clearly
(f1(u), . . . , fl(u)) := ψ(F
−(u))
is such that (f1(E), . . . , fl(E)) has law λl and the fi are measurable.
Lemma 7.3. Let µ(dy, dz) = ν(y, dz)δ(dy) be a probability on RN2 × RN1 such that δ(dy) is
a probability on RN2 and ν(y, dz) is a probabilistic kernel. Assume that Y has law δ(dy) and
E is independent of Y and uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Then there is a measurable function
G : RN2 × [0, 1]→ RN1 such that (Y,G(Y,E)) has law µ(dy, dz).
Proof. Just like in the previous proof, fix a Borel isomorphism ψ : R→ RN1 . Consider the measure
on R×RN2 defined by µ˜(A×B) := ∫A ν(y, ψ(B))δ(dy), A ∈ B(RN2), B ∈ B(R). For δ-almost every
y, ν(y, ψ(·)) is a probability measure on R. Let F (y, z) := ν(y, ψ((−∞, z]))) denote its cumulative
distribution function and define
F−(y, u) := inf{q ∈ Q : F (y, q) ≥ u}, u ∈ (0, 1),
this is easily seen to be B(RN2)⊗ B([0, 1])-measurable. Then, for δ-almost every y, F−(y, E) has
law ν(y, ψ(·)). Hence (Y, F−(Y,E)) has law µ˜. Consequently, (Y, ψ(F−(Y,E))) has law µ and we
may conclude setting G(y, u) := ψ(F−(y, u)). The technique of this proof is well-known, see e.g.
page 228 of Bhattacharya and Waymire (1990).
Lemma 7.4. Let (Z˜,W ) be a R×Rk-valued random variable with continuous everywhere positive
density f(x1, . . . , xk+1) (with respect to the k + 1-dimensional Lebesgue measure) such that the
function
x1 → sup
x2,...,xk
f(x1, . . . , xk+1) (32)
is integrable on R. Then there is a homeomorphism H : Rk+1 → [0, 1]×Rk such that Hi(x1, . . . , xk+1) =
xi for i = 2, . . . , k + 1 and Z := H1(Z˜,W ) is uniform on [0, 1], independent of W .
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Proof. The conditional distribution function of Z˜ knowing W = (x2, . . . , xk+1),
F (x1, . . . , xk+1) :=
∫ x1
−∞
f(z, x2, . . . , xk+1)dz∫∞
−∞
f(z, x2, . . . , xk+1)dz
,
is continuous (due to the integrability of (32) and Lebesgue’s theorem). By everywhere positivity
of f , F is also strictly increasing in x1. It follows that the function
H : (x1, . . . , xk+1)→ (F (x1, . . . , xk+1), x2, . . . , xk+1)
is a bijection and hence a homeomorhpism by Theorem 4.3 in Deimling (1985). The conditional law
P (H1(Z˜,W ) ∈ · |W = (x2, . . . , xk+1)) is uniform on [0, 1] for Lebesgue-almost all (x2, . . . , xk+1),
which shows that H1(Z˜,W ) is independent of W with uniform law on [0, 1].
Corollary 7.5. Let (Z˜1, . . . , Z˜k) be an R
k-valued random variable with continuous and everywhere
positive density (w.r.t. the k-dimensional Lebesgue measure) such that for all i = 1, . . . , k, the
function
z → sup
x1,...,xi−1,xi+1,...,xk
f(x1, . . . , xi−1, z, xi+1, . . . , xk) (33)
is integrable on R. There are independent random variables Z1, . . . , Zk and homeomorphisms
gl(k) : R
l → Rl, 1 ≤ l ≤ k such that (Z˜1, . . . , Z˜l) = gl(k)(Z1, . . . , Zl).
Proof. The case k = 1 is vacuous and k = 2 follows by Lemma 7.4. Assume that the statement
is true for k, let us prove it for k + 1. We may set gl(k + 1) := gl(k), 1 ≤ l ≤ k, it remains to
construct gk+1(k + 1) and Zk+1.
Lemma 7.4 provides a homeomorphism s : Rk+1 → Rk+1 such that sm(x1, . . . , xk+1) = xm, 1 ≤
m ≤ k and Zk+1 := sk+1(Z˜1, . . . , Z˜k+1) is independent of (Z˜1, . . . , Z˜k) (and hence of (Z1, . . . , Zk) =
gk(k)
−1(Z˜1, . . . , Z˜k)). Define a : R
k+1 → Rk+1 by
a(x1, . . . , xk+1) := (gk(k)
−1(x1, . . . , xk), sk+1(x1, . . . , xk+1))
= s(gk(k)
−1(x1, . . . , xk), xk+1),
a is a homeomorphism since it is the composition of two homeomorphisms. As then a(Z˜1, . . . , Z˜k+1) =
(Z1, . . . , Zk+1), the result is shown setting gk+1(k + 1) := a
−1.
Remark 7.6. Condition (33) is quite weak, it holds, for example, when there is C > 0 such that
f(x) ≤ C
1 + |x|2 , x ∈ R
k.
Assumption 7.7. Let G0 = {∅,Ω}, Gt = σ(Z˜1, . . . , Z˜t) for 1 ≤ t ≤ T , where the Z˜i, i = 1, . . . , T
are RN -valued random variables with a continuous and everywhere positive joint density f on RTN
such that (33) holds with k = TN . S0 is constant and ∆St is a continuous function of (Z˜1, . . . , Z˜t),
for all t ≥ 1.
Furthermore, Ft = Gt ∨ F0, t ≥ 0, where F0 = σ(ε˜) with ε˜ uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and
independent of (Z˜1, . . . , Z˜T ).
Remark 7.8. If Assumption 7.7 above holds true then so does Assumption 5.1, in virtue of
Corollary 7.5. Assumption 7.7 may be easier to verify in certain model classes.
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